Tomorrow, Thursday, 15 May 2025, another round of “peace negotiations” may take place in Istanbul. Following the visit of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a joint statement was issued calling for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire — a proposal originally put forward by President Trump. This initiative aimed to lay the groundwork for genuine peace talks. However, the Kremlin responded with yet another deflection strategy, proposing a round of sham negotiations in Istanbul.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the Kremlin’s bluff by announcing his readiness to negotiate personally with President Putin — an offer the latter predictably declined, as acknowledging Zelenskyy would imply recognition of his legitimacy, which the Kremlin officially denies. A decisive obstacle to any lasting peace is the ideological underpinning of Russia’s foreign policy — a worldview shaped over 25 years of Putin’s rule, which continues to fuel Moscow’s neo-imperialist agenda, particularly in what it considers its “near abroad.”

So what is the underlying justification and ideology of the Kremlin and Russia’s imperialism to justify its full-scale invasion of a smaller neighbor violating international law?

Defining Russian Imperialism

Let’s start by defining what imperialism means. Imperialism is defined as a state policy, practice or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas. Following this definition, Russia’s foreign policy since the rise to power of Vladimir Putin can most certainly be classified as imperialist, considering its invasion of Georgia in 2008, activities in Syria in 2012, and the invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. This imperialist policy is based on different key elements that have developed over time, defining the Kremlin’s rule. These elements are reiterated in various ways and spread through different means of communication to reach all social classes, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the Kremlin’s rule and foreign policy.

Here, ideology is understood both in the political science sense — as a systematic model of thought that justifies and explains the political actions of the ruling elite and purports to offer solutions to all societal problems, thus structuring the political life of the individual who must conform to the ideology — and in the sociological sense, as the lens through which a person sees the world: the total sum of a person’s values, beliefs, assumptions, and expectations shaping thoughts, actions, and interactions, along with broader social dynamics.

Eclectidology: The Bricolage Ideology of Putin’s Russia

Unlike the totalitarian ideologies of the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, Russia’s current ideological foundation is neither internally consistent nor formally codified, but rather what theologians or philosophers might call syncretism or eclecticism. — a patchwork of selectively appropriated historical myths, religious symbolism, conservative values, and authoritarian nationalism to create a flexible, modern ideology underpinning the Russian system. It has continously emerged as a form of bricolage. Therefore, I propose the neologism “eclectidology” to distinguish this modern patchwork Russian ideology from older, more static forms of state ideologies. This bricolage justifies both the Kremlin’s internal authoritarianism and its aggressive foreign policy.

For example, Putin has gradually rehabilitated Stalin as a state-builder and borrowed concepts like the “fifth column” directly from the Stalinist Great Terror. To justify the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, he invoked the tale of restoring Novorossiya (the areas of Ukraine conquered by Catherine the Great). He also frequently cites orthodox Eurasianist “philosophers” like Ivan Ilyin to portray Russia as distinctive and different in both history and essence compared to the rest of Europe and Asia.

Putin elevates the idea of an imperial-nationalist stable state, reinforcing Russia’s self-image as a great power, promoting Russian exceptionalism, and framing a historical struggle of Russia against external enemies, embodied by “Nazis” and the West. This ideology thus has both an internal dimension — justifying the Kremlin’s rule within Russia — and an external dimension — justifying the Kremlin’s foreign policy. These are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

The 5 Main Elements Are

• Historical Continuity of Russian Civilization
  Russia is depicted as the inheritor of a millennia-old civilizational legacy, tracing its roots to Kievan Rus. The Kremlin presents modern Russia as the Third Rome — the final bastion of traditional values and Christian orthodoxy. This mythos defines Russia as a Great Power with a unique civilizational path.
• Russian Exceptionalism
  The Kremlin portrays Russia as inherently different from the rest of the world — exceptional in its values, history, and destiny. This is closely linked to concepts of Russia as a Civilisation State and Eurasianism. This exceptionalism is used to reject Western models of governance, international norms, and integration. According to this view, Russia is the centre of a unique Eurasian civilisation with a sovereign, non-Western path. The old Slavophile vs. Westerniser debate is revived — with the former now firmly dominant.
• Cultural Conservatism and Anti-Westernism
  Putin’s regime positions Russia as the guardian of “true” European values — Russia is framed as a civilization-state guarding traditional family and gender roles, and resisting the materialism and individualism of the West. The West is simultaneously an object of desire (for its living standards) and contempt (for its perceived moral decay). According to this narrative, Europe is nothing more than a cover for U.S. imperialismThis narrative resonates deeply with traditionalist segments of Russian society and provides ideological justification for repression and militarism.
• Personalism and the Cult of Putin
  The System Putin remains loosely institutionalised. Much of it relies on informal personal networks within the government. The ideological flexibility of “eclectidology” is crucial in maintaining internal cohesion in the absence of a extensive codified constitutional framework.
• The Myth of the Great Patriotic War
  Perhaps the most powerful ideological tool is the continued invocation of World War II — the “Great Patriotic War.” Billions of rubles have been spent amplifying this narrative. The Kremlin uses this myth to claim that any resistance to its actions is “Nazism,” thereby legitimizing invasions as acts of moral righteousness.

Russia’s eclectidology emphasizes an imperial nationalist sense of historic continuity, amplified by the self-image of Russia as a great power and its historical struggle against the West. Stability is said to stem from traditional values and Russian exceptionalism. Russia is portrayed as possessing a thousand-year-old civilization tracing back to the Kyivan Rus. This implies Russia must be a strong, stable state, “allowing Russians to be Russians,” free from foreign influence, and living a distinct Russian way of life.

The Kremlin depicts Russia as the only true bulwark of traditional Europe, standing against the moral decay observed in the West. Moscow is the Third Rome; the Orthodox Church the saviour of true Christianity. The narrative claims that this historical legacy has been transformed into a modern nation-state bringing peace, prosperity, and harmony to Russia. Cultural conservatism is emphasized: Russians are portrayed as knowing their roots and possessing the only true European norms, while Western Europe has lost its way by embracing “abnormalities” like equal rights and multiculturalism.

This narrative is closely tied to a cult of personality, as the “System Putin” has not been translated into classical institutions. Much of it relies on informal personal networks within the government, rendering an unsystematic ideology necessary for internal stability. According to this narrative, Russia is the center of a distinct Eurasian civilization with its own sovereign path, separate from Europe. Since it is different, Russia does not need to integrate with or engage on European terms. This self-reflection has historical roots reaching back to the czarist empire and the debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers.

Of course, this narrative falls short when compared to current reality, especially for ordinary citizens, as seen in stagnating economic development, continued dependence on natural resource exports, and the failure of modernization — only further entrenched by the current war economy, which has pushed civilian sectors into recession. This is not to mention record-high divorce rates (up to 80%), the highest alcoholism rates in Europe, and an elite that sends its children to the very “morally decadent” West it claims to oppose.

This is flanked by a strong anti-Western sentiment that defines the West as the Other — a continuation of ideological patterns from Soviet times. Russia is framed as a civilization-state guarding traditional family and gender roles, and resisting the materialism and individualism of the West. The West is simultaneously an object of desire (for its living standards) and contempt (for its perceived moral decay). According to this narrative, Europe is nothing more than a cover for U.S. imperialism.

Furthermore, Russia is portrayed as under constant threat from abroad. Putin has called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. The 1917 collapse of the czarist empire is also deeply etched into Russia’s collective memory. Even more prominent, however, are memories of the 1990s, when abrupt liberalization led to foreign influence and widespread feelings of humiliation. The loss of statehood during these years was equated with a loss of cultural selfhood — a sentiment the Kremlin expertly exploits to justify the need for national unity.

Last but not least is the founding myth of Putinism, which has gained increasing importance in recent years. The Kremlin has spent billions of rubles to amplify the supposed relevance of the “Great Patriotic War” to Russia’s current identity and its great power status. Since 2014, the heritage of that war and the ongoing war against Ukraine have been deliberately conflated, most notably through the use of the St. George’s ribbon (which Xi Jinping, incidentally, wore during his visit to the 2025 Victory Parade). This symbol, once used to commemorate veterans, was printed on the Luhansk and Donetsk sham referendum forms and tied to the helmets of Russian soldiers attacking Kyiv in 2022. The rhetorical strategy is simple: anyone who disagrees with Russia’s interpretation of WWII or its claim to a sphere of influence is dismissed as a Nazi seeking to overturn the results of the Great Patriotic War. This framing conveniently justifies both the 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine: if Russia does not act, Nazis will return, and the West will try once again to destroy Russia, just as the Nazis did in the 1940s.

These ideological elements not only shape Russia’s internal repressive apparatus by narrowing the space for dissent, but also strongly influence the Kremlin’s foreign policy decisions.

Foreign Policy: Revanchism and the “Near Abroad”

To understand Russian foreign policy, one must grasp a crucial historical fact: Russia did not acquire an empire; from the 17th century until the collapse of the Soviet Union, it always was one. The collapse created a profound psychological and political rupture, compounded by economic depression and a sense of unjustified degradation — leading to a desire to reclaim Russia’s „rightful“ status on the world stage.

The key ideological concept here is the “Near Abroad,” referring to the now-independent countries of the former Soviet Union. The term is used to justify a special interest and paternalistic relationship, rooted in alleged historical and cultural commonalities. But it is paternalistic precisely because it ignores the actual interests of those countries. This is a thinly veiled attempt to legitimize Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions under the banner of Eurasianism.

One often-used narrative in Russian foreign policy is the charge of Russophobia, frequently invoked by regime figures such as FM Lavrov, spokespeople Peskov and Zakharova, or Putin himself. According to this narrative, legitimate concerns from neighbouring countries are not based on real threats, but on Western manipulation and intelligence-induced paranoia. In this framing, every expression of sovereignty by countries in Russia’s sphere of influence is labelled a “colour revolution.” The term Russophobia is used as a rhetorical dead-end to silence criticism of Russian policy.

Closely linked to this is whataboutism — portraying Russia’s actions as normal behaviour within an anarchic international system, while deflecting criticism by pointing to Western double standards.

Finally, Russian leaders often argue that their actions at home and abroad are necessary to maintain stability, while opponents‘ actions are painted as destabilising. This narrative is especially evident in operations on the African continent and in Syria, where the now-abolished Wagner Group (whose ties to the Kremlin were denied for years, only to be admitted during the war in Ukraine) is depicted as a stabilizing force fighting against the unjust dominance of the West and promoting a „fairer,“ multipolar world order — with Russia, of course, as one of the poles.

Conclusion

Russia’s neo-imperialist ideology under Putin is not an accidental by-product of authoritarian rule — it is a deliberate construction, crafted over decades to sustain internal control and justify aggressive actions abroad. This “eclectidology” blends historical nostalgia, cultural conservatism, civilizational exceptionalism, and selective myth-making into a flexible but potent narrative. It allows the Kremlin to present expansionism as restoration, repression as tradition, and imperialism as stability.

Crucially, this ideological framework is not just a rhetorical device. It shapes strategic decisions, domestic propaganda, and foreign policy objectives. Any serious attempt to address Russia’s actions — whether through diplomacy, deterrence, or containment — must take this ideology seriously. Without confronting the ideological roots of Russia’s neo-imperialism, efforts to restore peace and preserve international norms will remain fragile and incomplete.

Policy Recommendations

1. No Return to Business as Usual
   The West must accept that ideological revanchism — not Western provocation — drives Russian aggression. Normalization under these conditions only rewards expansionism.
2. Support Ukraine to Endure
   Military and financial support for Ukraine is not charity, but a strategic investment in European security and international norms.
3. Expose and Undermine the Kremlin’s Narratives
   Support independent media, counter-disinformation efforts, and education in Russia’s periphery. Create pro-European and Western Bot farms to fight in the Hybrid Realm of Narrative control. Challenge the mythologizing of WWII (e.g. Russia’s Role in the Hitler-Stalin and Molotov-Ribbentrop pact) and highlight contradictions in the Kremlin’s ideology.
4. Reinforce Eastern European Resilience
   Boost the democratic, economic, and defensive capacities of vulnerable states — from Moldova to the Baltic States.
5. Use Strategic Patience
   Putinism will not disappear overnight. The ideology is now deeply rooted in Russian society. The West must develop a long-term containment and engagement strategy.