The quantity and quality of some of the contributions to the debate on the shift of the balance of power in Europe towards the East suggest that the new axis of Europe’s engine would no longer be Berlin – Paris, but Warsaw – Kiev. Let us see. By Paul Schweickhardt

Loss of prestige and initiative or loss of power?

Without question, the war breaks with past decades of the mainly German foreign policy dogma of change through trade, which other European countries, both in the West and in the East, also followed. The same strategy was also pursued by the USA towards China until Obama’s time in office. In the case of the USA, however, this strategy would probably have been reconsidered immediately if China had tried to annex Taiwan. The way Germany and France dealt with Russia even after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 will justifiably haunt both countries for a very long time to come.  

Nevertheless, the speed with which Germany, for example, turned away from Nord Stream 2 after the outbreak of the war and detached itself from its economic dependence on Russia – if, in retrospect, one can speak of such a dependence at all – will probably only gain full recognition in the reappraisal of the events surrounding the war. The remaining incomprehension among the other allies about the sluggish participation of Germany and France in arms deliveries and about the opinion, still prevalent at the beginning of the war, that Putin had to be given a ‚face-saving‘ exit from the war is too great.

Macrons words about Europe’s strategic independence fall flat under these impressions, because who should one be able to rely on within Europe once the USA is no longer there? Paris? Berlin? Should a serious attempt at strategic independence be made in Europe in the future, Berlin and Paris in particular, but also Madrid and Rome, would have to make it much clearer to what extent they can really enforce it and then also guarantee it for smaller countries and countries bordering on an aggressor. The extent to which Paris and Berlin still have to be urged to move after almost a year of war does not at all create the necessary confidence for Eastern Europe to rely less on NATO, especially the USA or Great Britain, and more on a possible European army in the future.

European army or NATO after all?

A development that could actually make the idea of such strategic independence palatable to Eastern Europe once again would probably be the cold withdrawal should there be another paradigm shift in the White House towards a NATO-critical or exclusively Pacific security policy orientation. Only the unpredictability of today’s US political culture and a Republican Party without a compass allows one to keep this alternative in mind.

However, this seems unlikely at the moment, and in the medium or long term, an ongoing transition to a division of NATO’s eastern and western flanks between the US and Canada, which are turning towards China, and Europe, which ensures the continent’s new security architecture after the war and the conclusions drawn from it, would also be conceivable. In both cases, a situation seems to be emerging in which neither Paris nor Berlin is willing or able to evade such responsibility again.

Nor will they want to be overtaken in their own European leadership claims by other countries that are significantly smaller in population and economy. Not to forget the United Kingdom, as a major European military power without simultaneous membership in the EU, as a strong indication of a continued focus on NATO with a significantly increased European contribution to the security architecture here, instead of a common European army.

Foresight and pressure from the East

Poland and the Baltics in particular are driving the debate on a tougher stance with Moscow, higher sanctions, more arms to Ukraine, etc., but this is more an expression of an increased and more aggressive initiative, especially of Poland and the Baltics, on this one specific issue, rather then a show of force. For a long time, they warned and were not heard. For a long time their words were dismissed and subordinated to national economic interests of Western European countries, especially Germany and France.

„If only we had listened to them earlier!“, many think to themselves. Without question, this strengthens the weight of future words from the same mouths. Since the issue of the war in Ukraine is, of course, overshadowing all other political issues and agendas at the moment, the increase in influence on this issue also overshadows the sheer number of other political issues where this influence is nowhere near as great, though probably greater than before the war.

It is nevertheless not so easily transferable to other political contentious issues, especially, like in Poland or Hungary, the rule of law, anti-corruption, or the protection of minorities. Now, when Poland in particular desperately needs Europe and NATO, these issues seem far in the past, but they are not. The moment the war finally comes to an end, these issues will come to the fore again and some Eadtern European actors who now seem in initiative, will have to answer the same questions with the same reactionary rhetoric that now Germany and France use.

The future role of Ukraine

A central argument that would better illustrate a shift in the balance of power to the east of Europe, however, finds no consideration in the current debate, coupled with the premise that Ukraine will finally win this war. If that day comes and Ukraine becomes a member of the EU and NATO as a result, these organizations will have a new member state with more than 40 million inhabitants. In one fell swoop, Ukraine would be the fifth largest country in the European Union in terms of population, and even second in terms of surface area.

Economically, Ukraine continues to lag far behind in comparison to its population and size, mainly due to the damage caused by the war, also already before, but the reconstruction aid and other FDI that follows will lead to a renewed infrastructure and rapid economic growth. Together with institutional reforms and closer integration with Western economies, along with all the benefits of EU membership, the conditions are in place for a new economic miracle à la Marshall.

Poland’s immense help, especially in housing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees and giving millions a safe haven and first help on their way further West, will also strengthen Poland’s position as the mouthpiece of the European East in the future. There will certainly be intensive political exchanges and agreements between these two countries in the long term. Thanks to its high popularity and its immense soft power, Ukraine can always stand by Poland in debates within the European Union or NATO, especially in cases in which Polands stand is not that popular itself. Especially in the case of possible future changes in the decision-making process of the European institutions, where qualitative majorities could gradually replace the system of unanimity, these 40 million Ukrainian citizens would carry immense weight.

A different balance of power within Europe

In the short term, the often-titled power shift is palpable, albeit strongly issue-specific and, beyond the issue of foreign and security policy vis-à-vis Russia, just as strongly dependent on agreement on other political issues in the medium term. Nothing unites better than a common enemy, but once it is defeated, what then? In the past, Hungary and Poland were pretty much best friends in rejecting many decisions from Brussels. At the moment, however, they could hardly be further away from this unity.

In the long term, however, at the latest with Ukraine’s membership in the EU, it would be clearly noticeable and consolidated. The war-induced focus on the increased influence of these few countries in the East, however, almost makes one forget for example Spain’s influence within the EU, i.e. on the other side of the European continent, which has been growing steadily for years. So more than a shift of power towards explicitly the European East, it is a development away from the classic Paris-Berlin axis.

Are influence and power the same thing?

Following Weber’s definition of power, according to which power is all the opportunities within social relations to assert one’s own will even in the face of opposition, in the current constitution of the EU power continues to be in the hands of the donor countries. Not Poland nor the Baltics are forcing Germany to send Leopard II tanks by stopping financial payments. Rather, it is vociferously pushing, together with other clearly more influential countries such as the USA or the UK, a discussion that builds up international moral pressure on the countries of the European West.

This suggests that it is not Poland or other countries of the European East alone that are driving the change of policy in Paris or Berlin here. As in the current case, Germany remains free to say it will not supply modern battle tanks to Ukraine. Rather, in the past it was Warsaw that was financially pressured in its own policy decision making process, such as the judicial reform planned by PiS, or in Budapest in the fight against corruption, without the backing of larger third powers. However, these are not particular national interests of the European West, but fundamental prerequisites of EU membership and are therefore of pan-European interest.

Bad for Nationalisms – Good for Europe

For Germany and France, meanwhile, influence and international prestige have been damaged to such an extent that in the short and medium term they must both focus on expanding their hard power in order to compensate for the influence they lost during the Ukraine war and taking a more proactive role in Europe that it has been expected from its allies. In the long term, this will restore confidence and prestige within NATO and the EU and at the same time create the conditions for a strategic independence of Europe for when it is actually politically desired at some point.

Of course, the projection of national interests in foreign policy is a central motivator for the individual member states within the EU. Nevertheless, the spirit of the EU as well as the recent institutional reforms, as outdated as they may already appear in today’s context, is precisely not the hegemonic position of a few great powers. Even in voting models with qualitative majorities, the votes of Germany and France will continue to outweigh those of other, smaller countries, but this is obvious given the immense differences in population size between member states.

Rather, a shift, or distribution, of power on different specific political issues, consensus building and discourse in the face of disagreement, is the fulfilment of the promise made to the countries of Eastern Europe as a counter to their previous experience in the Soviet Union when they entered the European Union: To be able to shape the fate and fortunes of a genuine community of states on an equal footing, based on rules. To what extent the current development will be consolidated in the future, for example in the form of a revival of the Weimar Triangle, however, remains to be seen. At the latest, however, the idea of unanimity must be abandoned in a more multi-stakeholder EU – also to the displeasure of some Eastern European countries.