Originally published the 04.11.2022

Russia’s relation with Belarus has been quite paradoxical in the past. Belarus was one of the founding states of the Soviet Union in 1922 and one of its gravediggers in 1991. In fact, the dissolution of the USSR occurred at the Belarusian-Polish border in Belovezhskaya-Puscha. And still today, Belarus seems to be the most Soviet of all former republics: There, the KGB is still called KGB and the state has kept a very tight grip on the economy resulting for example in a recent measure by Lukashenka to forbid to increase prices in an effort to tackle the economic difficulties and inflation Belarus faces linked to western sanctions. They have been introduced after the crackdown of the 2020 protest movement in the aftermath of the presidential elections and tightened as a response to Belarus role in Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Belarus and Russia have been engaged in the process of integration for more than 20 years with the official goal to create a ‘Union State’. In the past Lukashenka has brokered rather successful to make the most out of this uncomfortable position -being a small state with only 9,5 million inhabitants facing a more and more aggressive Russia with 15 times the population and by hedging between Russia, the EU and China. In 1994, Lukashenka actually proposed himself the Union State with one eye on the possibility to follow Boris Yeltsin as a leader of both political entities before Vladimir Putin grabbed the power in Russia. The personal relationship between the two autocrats is according to numerous reports difficult and marked by personal animosities making the latest rapprochement rather a marriage of convenience than one out of love.

Belarus’s geography alone makes it from a geostrategic perspective supremely important to Russia. Sitting between Russia and Poland along the east-west axis and between the Baltic States and Poland among the north-south axis it is both: A principal defensive bulwark and a forward base for power projection as could have been observed during Russia’s invasion when Russian troops used Belarus as a logistics hub to launch their unsuccessful attempt to take Kyiv in the beginning of the war. Together with the Russian exclave Kaliningrad Belarus is also forming the Suwalki gap and hence is a valuable asset for Russia in the strategic and military competition with NATO in the region. Belarus is moreover member of all Russian dominated organisations: most importantly the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Even though the CSTO has only been used once effectively at the beginning of this year to crack down the protests in Kazakhstan and has been proved to be largely ineffective in the case of Azerbaijan’s attack on Armenia.

For decades Lukashenka was able to successfully hedge between Russia, the West and more recently China. But his room for manoeuvre shrank drastically after the brutal crackdown of a wave of protests of unprecedented scale against his regime linked to the -allegedly- lost election against Sviatlana Tsikanowskaja. The EU and other western states did not recognize the result of the elections. According to a report of the UN, between May 2020 and May 2021 at least 37 000 people were detained. Those crackdowns came at the cost of sanctions imposed by the EU and western allies which have been enlarged after the diversion of a Ryanair flight to Minsk were a regime critic has been arrested and for the attempted use of migrants as a hybrid weapon against the EU to blackmail the lift of sanctions in exchange for stopping this practice. The closed door to the west left Lukashenka de-facto with only one option to get the crucial support for his regime stability from Russia and Putin provided that with announcing that the Russian military stood ready to intervene –“if necessary”-. But this help came with an attached price tag and can become very expensive for Minsk. As the war has changed the perception of Belarus in the Kremlin. It seems to be quite clear now that -notwithstanding previous talk of Belarus’s state sovereignty- Putin intends for his neighbour to become an entirely subordinate client state. The shift became clear in November 2021 when Lukashenka in an interview with Russian propagandist Dmtry Solovyev suddenly claimed that he did recognise Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The same month, the two presidents signed a new security doctrine that has only been published on the Union State’s website in February 2022. It altered Belarus’s national security status from a previously “neutral” country with a nuclear-free status, as agreed on in the Budapester Memorandum 1993, to deleting the text altogether. The amendment has been kept vague, keeping all possibilities open, but some analysts claim that it was clearly altered to allow Russia to launch a military offensive on northern Ukraine from Belarusian territory. After the unsuccessful attempt to take Kyiv lots of Russian troops withdraw via Belarus and also missile strike on Ukraine from Belarusian territory have been continued to be launched. Consequently, In the UN general assembly Belarus has been voting consequently in favour of Russia since the war started, making Belarus one of the few outspoken Russian allies together with Syria, Nicaragua and North Korea.

Therefore, in the military realm, this goal seems to be achieved already. Russian troops enter and leave Belarus de-facto solely after their own assessment. Lukashenko seems to have given away all military sovereignty for regime security. In an interview the Russian ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov noted, that Belarus plays a rather important role in the framework of the “special military operation” But the situation is more complex. In an attempt to regain some agency Belarus held a constitutional referendum on February 27^th to approve changes that not only had as a goal to solidify Lukashenko’s position until 2035 but also further weakened the Belarusian parliament. The tightening of his circle of trust around himself and ensuring that politics in Belarus remains entirely personal and tied to him alone might suggest that he has concerns about Russia’s plans for his future. Lukashenka’s ambiguity in public rhetoric and foreign policy further complicates the picture. After all, he is a product of the soviet nomenclatura where you fake action as long as you can in order to satisfy your superiors without being forced to actually follow with decisive actions. In the initial weeks of the full-scale war Minsk tried to establish itself again as the primary locale for negotiations and hosted three rounds of Russian-Ukranian talks that failed and left Belarus basically without any own agency in the war. Yauheni Preiherman from the Think Tank Minsk Dialogue argues that:

“Minsk appears to be using the hypothetical NATO argument more broadly to emphasize that it must focus on the defense of the Untion State of Belarus and Russia in the Western strategic direction.”

Yauheni Preiherman, Minsk Dialogue

In favour of this argumentation speaks the rhetoric of late June 2022 when Lukashenka asked Putin to consider a joint military activity as a response to “increased military activity by NATO” and the equipment of Belarus with nuclear capable airplanes. The two autocrats agreed also on supplying Belarus with Iskander-M operational and tactical missile systems which can be used in a conventional way but is also capable to be used with nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. Additionally, the two leaders announced that Russia would upgrade Belarus Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft to enable it to carry nuclear warheads. In August 2022 Lukashenka stated the conversion of the airplanes have been completed. At this point that information is not really verifiable.

According to Preiherman the Belarusian government is likely trying to achieve at least three specific goals by doubling down on the hypothetical NATO attack argument and talking about a threat of attack from Ukraine on Belarus. Firstly, Minsk applies it apparently as an argument of last resort to not actively participate in the war. As public opinion seems to be decisively negative with 90% of Belarusians opposing a direct military involvement of Belarus in the war. Belarusians see themselves traditionally as a peaceful nation. Thus, Lukashenka fears public backlash if joining the invasion. Secondly, with his aggressive rhetoric Lukashenka seems trying to appease the hawks in Russian society by raising rhetorical stakes vis-à-vis NATO and lastly the Belarusian leader is apparently attempting to gain access to Russia’s military strategic planning, including the nuclear realm trying to mirror NATO approaches to nuclear sharing.

Russia used its leverage to force Belarus not only to be a logistical hub in the beginning of this war but also to support the invasion with sending military equipment and ammunition. This is another indicator that no direct military involvement of Belarus is planned so far. Why deplete your own army’s military stocks if it plans to attack? It is more plausible that the propping up the Russian troop numbers again in Belarus to use the potential danger of further military activities out of Belarus to bind Ukrainian troops at the northern flank so they cannot be used in the counter offensive started this fall by the Ukrainian armed forces as they need to protect the Belarusian-Ukrainian border.

Another invasion attempt out of Belarus seems to be unlikely at this point. Even after the decision of both autocrats on October 10^th, 2022, to deploy a joint military task force the planned number of around 9000 Russian troops in Belarus seems to be insufficient to be able to achieve what a much larger force has not been able to in March. Military analysts say that Belarus has at this moment around 15 000 combat ready troops on its own and the rest of the army would be worse equipped than Russian conscripts. With 90% of Belarusians opposing Belarusian participation in the war the morale would be even lower than among Russian troops. It is probably safe to assume that draft dodging and desertation would certainly be normalized.

Moreover, Lukashenka would risk the routing of Belarus’s most combat ready forces, which would risk regime security given how autocrats have historically fared after suffering military defeat and an facing an emboldened civil society. Furthermore, Ukraine is a lot better prepared this time. The UAF have mined the streets, blown up strategically important bridges and is monitoring all activities at the boarder very closely. Hence, it seems more likely that Russia is using the deployment of troops as an opportunity to train reservists it has mobilized at a time when in Russia there is a shortage of both officers and equipment for training purposes.

Lukashenka has accused Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine of training Belarusian radicals to “carry out sabotage, terrorist attacks and to organise a military mutiny in the country.” Calling the latest actions, a response to NATO provocations on the border, the formation of sabotage units staffed by Belarusian emigres and Ukranian plans further increasing the probability to use this argumentation to stay out of the war to not risk its own defensive capabilities.

In the light of the risks involved Lukashenka can be expected to prevaricate as long as possible. His best argument against full entry into the war will be that for the Kremlin the small military gains that would have been provided by the Belarusian army is not worth the serious risk of destabilizing Belarus which has become a reliable logistics hub for the Russian army.

Still, the fact remains that Lukashenka has presided over an escalation, real and rhetorical alike and it cannot completely ruled out that he genuinely fears a military or diversionary attack on Belarus. Hundreds of Belarusian volunteers are fighting on the side of Ukraine and some of them are quite open about their determination to bring down their country’s pro-Russian authoritarian regime after the war. Meanwhile, the Belarusian opposition based in Lithuania and Poland is undergoing something like militarization of its own: in August, former senior police officer Alexander Azarov and retired lieutenant colonel Valery Sakhaschyk joined Sviatlana Tsikanovskaya’s cabinet in exile as ministers. The opposition leaders in uniform have admitted preparing various regime change scenarios, including Lukashenka’s removal by force. This is evaluated by Minsk as part of Western intelligence preparations to attempt another “colour revolution” prompting the conduct of various counterterrorism exercises.

The military threat as estimated in Moscow and Minsk to deploy the regional group of forces is not disappearing anytime soon. Mostly because it seems to exist only on paper. But the linked erosion of Belarusian miliary and political sovereignty linked to Russia’s war on Ukraine is very real. Russia’s military presence in Belarus is seen in the Kremlin as the new normal.

Under all these circumstances Russia’s plans for its military springboard to the West might diverge in the future from relatively restricted at this stage of the war to become much more ambitious by the next. After all, it has been a fool’s game trying to anticipate the next steps of the Kremlin throughout the course of this war.